—69→ —70→ —71→ —72→ —73→
Galdós and the politics of conciliation96
In spite of the fact that it has great potential as an instrument for the critical elucidation of his novels, Galdós' non-fictional prose has been utilized until now sparingly and infrequently by most scholars. Of the three most important contributions to the problem, those of Shoemaker, Ruiz Ramón and Hinterhailser, only the latter has described some of the salient features of Galdós' articles for the Revista de España.97 This, despite the fact that Galdós was very active on the staff of the biweekly journal immediately prior to his sudden withdrawal from social and political life in 1872.98 Galdós joined the staff of the Revista de España in 1870, at a time when his countrymen were negotiating for a constitutional monarch.99 His first political article was published on 28 October: «La organización actual del Imperio austriaco. (XVI, 509-525)» Nevertheless, it was not until early 1871 that he devoted his efforts to the appraisal of politics at home. He began to contribute to the magazine's «Revista política interior», publishing a total of fourteen installments in 1871 and 1872.100
Because of their concentration in a fifteen-month period, these articles have a great historical pertinence as a contemporary account of the struggles and eventual failure of the monarchy to establish itself.101 Equally important is their utility in defining with greater accuracy Galdós' historicism as well as his attitudes to the various compelling issues of the day.102 The years immediately following the Revolution of September are also the major epoch to which Galdós returns in his later novels; the disparities and contrasts (as well as similarities) between the opinions of Galdós the reporter writing in 1872, and of Galdós the novelist writing ten to twenty years later, are therefore particularly valuable. Hence, an examination of the articles in the Revista de España is in order, and it is this which103 propose to do following a brief chronological sketch of the historical background against which they were written.104
Amadeo of Savoy arrived in Spain on 30 December, 1870, the day Prim died. The first Prime Minister of the new monarchy was General Francisco Serrano, one of the leaders of the September Revolution. After the elections in March, 1871, Serrano formed a ministry of «conciliation» comprised of members of the three main dynastic parties -Unionists (led by Serrano himself), Progressives (led by Manuel Ruiz Zorrilla and Práxedes Sagasta), and Democrats (led by Cristino Martos and Nicolás Maria Rivero). The Federal Republicans (whose leadership wavered between Francisco Pi y Margall, Emilio Castelar, E. Figueras and Nicolás Salmerón) were excluded from participation in the Serrano administration because they had opposed Amadeo ever since his candidature was announced by Prim. From the beginning the Serrano ministry was torn by divisiveness and mistrust. A ministerial crisis was provoked by the parliamentary disputes over the congratulatory message of the Cortes to Pope Pius IX on his twenty-fifth anniversary (June, 1871).
The ministry of conciliation was unable to recover; Serrano resigned in July, 1871, and Ruiz Zorrilla formed a new cabinet.
—74→Mutual acrimony between Ruiz Zorrilla and Sagasta paralyzed this government. Sagasta, a master manipulator in the Cortes, brought down Ruiz Zorrilla's Progressive ministry that October. In the process, the Progressive Party split, giving rise to the Radical Party under the aegis of Ruiz Zorrilla; Sagasta now headed the more conservative remnant of the Progressive Party, and it was he who convinced J. Malcampo to preside over a new government which lasted two months. That December Sagasta himself formed another cabinet; in January, 1872, he dissolved the Cortes and called for national elections to be held on 2 April. An interim govenment was then constituted, and due to Sagasta's heavy reliance on Unionists was extremely conservative.
The result of the elections was a foregone conclusion: Sagasta triumphed. The Carlists, under Cándido Nocedal's leadership, suffered a staggering electoral defeat as did the Alphonsists, Republicans and Radicals. Ruiz Zorrilla saw no other alternative for himself but to retire from politics. The Carlists, active in politics only since the previous summer of 1871 in which a political amnesty was granted, withdrew en masse from the Cortes on 15 April. On 21 April they revolted against the Monarchy which had been so hospitable to them.
It was not national disunity (which was exacerbated by the Carlist war in the north), but indiscretion committed by Amadeo which led to Sagasta's resignation in May, 1872. Serrano again took control of the government and formed a conservative cabinet. A month later, in June, the national crisis impelled him to attempt to suspend constitutional guarantees as sanctioned by Article 31 of the Constitution. Amadeo would not allow it. Serrano therefore resigned and retired from public life, taking his party with him. With Sagasta dishonored, Amadeo could now turn only to the Radicals and to Ruiz Zorrilla. The latter dissolved the Cortes on 28 June, 1872, and formed an interim government which was summarily approved (as expected) by the voters in the national elections that August.
During this period, one of the most important external factors affecting politics in Spain was the rise of the International. At first, Spanish participation in this organization was slight. It was only after the Congress of the International in Barcelona in June, 1870, that the Spanish section began to gather more adherents.105 When the Paris Commune shook the conservative elements in Europe during March-May, 1871, it elicited two important reactions in Spain. First, the conservative parties (Unionist and Progressive), spurred by Sagasta, condemned the Commune and finally succeeded in November, 1871, in outlawing the International. During Sagasta's ministry (December, 1871-May, 1872), persecution of the International was particularly intense.106 The second important reaction was the development of a split between the Internationalists and the Federal Republicans, despite the fact that Pi, Salmeffin and other Republican leaders had earlier defended the International in the debates in the Cortes that October (1871). For the September Revolution initiated a revolution of the Spanish middle-class.107 The Commune was a working-class revolt which failed, indeed was destroyed, at the hands of the middle class, just as the Spanish International was persecuted by Pi, Salmeffin and Castelar in 1873.108 Hence, the Paris Commune was later the symbol for many Spaniards of the beginnings of a workers' movement. The middle class -both in and outside Spain- which even today continues to place property rights above the rights of individuals, could not help but be horrified by the Commune and its implications. As we would expect, bourgeois reaction was entirely out of proportion to the strength and extent of the workers' movement.109
—75→These, then, are the main events which occurred during the period in which Galdós contributed to the «Revista política interior» of the Revista de España. It now remains to demonstrate Galdós' vision of and reactions to them.
Galdós at this point was against all extremes. In this context, the political faction which most often evoked his anger and disgust was the Carlist Party. Galdós was particularly incensed at the merger of the neo-Catholics with the Carlists.110 This party, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the papacy of Pius IX in June, 1871, precipitated a parlamentary crisis. On 28 June, Galdós makes clear the responsibility of the theocratic (i.e., neo-Catholic) wing:
| (XX, 627)111 | ||
What made this union even more insidious was the realization that previous to the fall of Isabel II, the neo-Catholics had been allies of the dynastic Moderate Party, and had controlled national policy by means of their influence in the Queen's camarilla. Isabel's submission to the camarilla and her resultant alienation of the Progressive Party had initiated the chain of events terminating in the September Revolution.112 Galdós feels only contempt for «...todos aquellos intrusos corifeos del neo-catolicismo, que después de haber servido, aconsejado, desprestigiado y perdido para siempre á la infortunada reina Isabel, la abandonaron desde que cayó del trono, para adorar á un idolo nuevo... (XXV, 616)» Indeed, all that is despicable in this amalgam of traditionalism and political opportunism is epitomized by the leader of the neos, Cándido Nocedal. Galdós suggests that even the majority of the Carlists themselves believe Nocedal to be as damaging to their king as he was to Isabel (XX, 133). And while he demonstrates no affection for the latter, Galdós is appalled by the lack of integrity of her former adviser (idem). In spite of his immense moral responsibility for the fall of Isabel II, Nocedal, by joining the Carlist Party, deprived her of any opportunities to regain the throne since he carried the clerical interests -formerly her principal element of support- with him into the Carlist camp (idem, 133-134; Galdós is not suggesting a restoration; he is simply describing the quality of Nocedal's constancy).113
But Carlist opportunism extends beyond this shabby treatment of its former liege by the neo-Catholic segment. Galdós is not at all oblivious to the irony inherent in Carlist attitudes toward liberalism. Constantly attempting to undermine it, they nevertheless prosper and find strength in its protection (XXV, 610). Hence, their notorious abuses of the freedom of the press (e.g., XX, 137; XXVI, 296).114 More infamous, however, is their flouting of the amnesty granted in the summer of 1871. —76→ Unhappy after the elections of 2 April, 1872, in which their representation in the Cortes was reduced from sixty-two to thirty-eight,115 the Carlists announced retraimiento (v n. 31 below) on 15 April (Galdós partially reproduces the text); six days later, they revolted. Galdós is outraged that the same men who enjoyed the benefits of the amnesty the preceeding summer are precisely those who now captain the Carlist ranks. There is only one possible explanation: «Como no tiene [el carlismo] idea del perdón, como su bandera ha sido siempre el ciego y sistemático exterminio, no es extraño que sea insensible á la virtud que encierran las tolerancias y magnanimidades del liberalismo... (XXV, 618-619)»
Once the Carlist War broke out, Galdós openly exhorted all liberal factions to exorcise absolutism from Spain. This is the age of the triumph of representative government; under such circumstances, the existence of Carlism «...hace creer á nuestros contemporáneos que España está aún en pleno periodo de leyenda... (idem, 614)». A month later, on 28 May, Galdós examines at length the problem of absolutism in Spain (XXVI, 292-296). The First Carlist War was by far more crucial, yet the seven years it continued were brief considering that these were the death throes of the absolutist principle which had governed Spain for hundreds of years: «...[el principio] desacreditado al fin por la crítica del siglo xviii... dejando el puesto á nuevas y más racionales organizaciones de la sociedad. (idem, 294)» Nor can that principle be resuscitated: hence, the greater failure of the second Carlist revolt.116
Although the political groups of the Left did not evoke his antipathy as did the Carlists, Galdós fears that they too threaten the political stability of the country. In June, 1871, he senses the precarious nature of Serrano's ministry of conciliation (XX, 634); after its fall, he bitterly records (13 January, 1872):
| (XXIV, 147)117 | ||
Throughout his articles (i.e., XX, 135; XXV, 133, 296, 613, 617;XXVI, 141-142; XXVII, 557, 562) Galdós considers the «partidos avanzados [i.e., the Federal Republican Party and the International]» a threat because they each advocate revolution: political in the case of the Republicans, and social in the case of the anarchist-oriented International.118 Employing ironic understatement, Galdós admits that it is said they desire to democratize government, which to him means «...guardar preferencias absurdas en favor de los que peor ejercitan las garantías del ciudadano, de mortificar sistemáticamente á las clases altas... (XXIV, 459)» This appalling attitude can be explained, but not excused, by Galdós' certainty that a revolution of any kind would, during this period, not only result in violence but more importantly be shortlived and unsuccessful: republicanism is too naive and unrealistic for it (XXV, 296) while anarchism, besides its own idealism, does not have enough converts («...ni existen aqui las inmensas muchedumbres de obreros corrompidos por las ideas comunistas... —77→ [XXVI, 142]»). It is an unhappy fact that Galdós was absolutely correct in assaying the political milieu of the time.119
Galdós, constantly complementing his reportage with editorial comments, condemns «la demagogia comunista» as an enemy of modern society, much like the Carlist Party in its advocacy of extra-legal methods. These two extremist groups in effect can be said to form «...el partido de la desesperacion. (XXV, 617)» He dreads the workers and their movement precisely because «...fundan su terrible imperio sobre las ruinas de la propiedad ajena. (XXVI, 141)» Discrediting the principles of authority in both civil and religious spheres, leftist ideologies (he calls them «crítica moderna [XXV, 613]») including republicanism by their very nature lead to the eventual destruction of «...importantísimos intereses e instituciones...» in both of those spheres (idem).
The Paris Commune and the rise of the International in Spain seriously challenged the electoral solidarity of the Republican Party.120 Resultant Republican efforts to retain its voter support, especially among the workers, effected the revival of the socialist polemic,121 as Galdós observed on 13 May, 1871 (XX, 132). Tacitly acknowledging (idem, 132, 135) that federalist socialism is attempting to associate itself with the efforts of the International in order to win votes from the proletariat, Galdós demonstrated his own paternalistic capitalism when observing that this drive would succeed: the members of the working class will always incline toward that ideology which offers them easily acquired comfort and security, rather than the
| (idem, 135) | ||
As long as the Commune continues to exist, nothing can be done to diminish the International's alluring power (idem, 135-136). Galdós viciously attacks that brand of federalism and its anti-bourgeois tendencies which, by competing with the International,
| (XXV, 296, italics mine) | ||
It is therefore not surprising to Galdós that republicanism, an institution which makes the law its religion, has in its ideological movement to the left become a haven for men of violence, «ateos de la ley. (idem, 133)» Under such circumstances, and keeping in mind «nuestras costumbres públicas», the republic once in power would not last very long, being no more than a «paseo sangriento y tabernario. (idem)»122
This constant manifestation of defensive paternalism toward the lower class and antipathy for left-wing ideologies makes it difficult for investigators such as Regalado to accept the fact that Galdós was indeed sympathetic toward the workers as a social group. Most importantly of all, he recognized the significance of their movement and their potential as an organized force in society. On 13 May, 1871, Galdós observes that the International is gaining ground in Spain. This organization, «...llevada de una falsa y exagerada idea de la filantropía universal... (XX, 135)» is beginning to alarm «...las personas sensatas... (idem)»123 because of its growth. But Galdós immediately goes on, adding
—78→| (idem, italics mine) | ||
This is not an isolated example.124
The least formidable opposition party, and therefore the one which least attracts Galdós' attention, is paradoxically the Alphonsist Party. It had no assemblies for open debate, this being an «...institución que no ama ni siquiera en efigie... (XXV, 129)», preferring rather the salons of the aristocracy which were more removed from public scrutiny. As a political force, it was almost non-existent, its influence basically limited to the city boundaries of Madrid (idem, 453). Nevertheless, Galdós is not misled by this party which he brands opportunist and reactionary, condemning it as a vestige of one of the country's saddest and most humiliating eras. After its utter defeat at the polls in April, Galdós predicts (13 May, 1872):
| (XXVI, 144) | ||
The history of the Monarchy is the history of the fortunes of the Radical Party. As earlier stated, this was part of the Progressive Party in Serrano's revolutionary ministry of conciliation, at that time united with the Democrats and the more conservative Unionists. However, Ruiz Zorrilla, leader of the Progressive-Democrat coalition, was distrustful of both the Unionists and the Monarchy. After the elections in March, 1871, Serrano made numerous Unionist appointments in the government, bringing Zorrilla into open dispute with what he regarded as a menace to his party's freedom. The factitious nature of the conciliation became patent as this controversy reached its climax (v, i.e., XX, 634), and in July of 1871 Serrano resigned, his cabinet crippled by disunity.125 Ironically, once in power Ruiz Zorrilla was unable to keep his party together; his differences with Sagasta brought about his fall in October, 1871, and the resultant irreconcilable division of the Progressive Party. Galdós mourns this disjunction as the greatest casualty of the first year of Amadeo's reign: «...era el núcleo de la fuerza revolucionaria, que formaba la base de la mayoría constitucional y parecia el lazo entre la democracia monárquica y el grupo conservador... (XXIV, 148)». The separation is the product of the conflicting temperaments of its leaders, not conflicting ideas. In any other country where principles rather than passions hold sway, the dualism inherent in this party would have eventually given rise to a constitutional two-party system. But in this case, «...los hombres se agrupan por resentimientos...» and Galdós can only find in it the harbingers of moral and political disintegration (idem, 148-149).
After the brief Malcampo ministry Sagasta formed a cabinet in which Unionist influence dominated. A succession of crises left him without a parliamentary consensus and he was forced to dissolve the Cortes in early 1872. Elections were called for 2 —79→ April (XXIV, 452-453). By late January Sagasta had formed an interim fusion government with the Unionists, a step which was perfectly logical and well-reasoned to Galdós' way of thinking (idem, 608-613). Resulting therefrom was the «...formacion del partido conservador nacional, al que sólo la incorregible mala fé, ó la vulgaridad de los agitadores de oficio puede acusar de reaccionario» (idem, 611, italics mine). Sagasta's fusion government follows in the tradition of revolutionary conciliation, and will hopefully put an end to those cabinets which by virtue of their «[caracteres] transitorios eclécticos y ambiguos» have divided the country, and plunged it into a morass of weakness and indecision. Galdós, sensing the urgency of the present situation and apprehensive that the fusion ministry will not survive the coming elections, makes an impassioned and almost pleading statement in its behalf:
| (idem, 608-609, italics mine) | ||
The reason for Galdós apprehension was due in part to the proposed formation of the so-called coalición nacional, an agreement between the opposition parties and the dynastic Radicals under Ruiz Zorrilla concerning voting strategy in the approaching elections (idem, 613-615). Previously, the opposition had on occasion plotted a joint electoral campaign with mixed results.126 But then the Radicals had fought a brilliant battle against the antidynastic coalitions (idem). That they should now join with the Carlists, Federal Republicans and Alphonsists in a struggle against the government is absurd, self-contradictory, self-destructive and criminal (idem). As Galdós wryly notes,
[...] basta preguntar á los radicales lo que entónces [sic] preguntaban estos á federales, moderados y carlistas: «suponiendo que venciérais juntos, ¿qué haríais después?» |
| (idem, 615) | ||
It is political opportunism which Galdós judges to be the motivating factor behind Ruiz Zorrilla's instigation of the coalición. By early March, the latter has become an inescapable fact of life, a terrifying index of the extent to which political factionalism and self-interest have divided the country and brought government to a standstill (XXV, 127-128). Galdós has been able to ferret out the details concerning the formation of the coalición, and closely examines this process and its background (idem, 128-130). The ruling junta of the Radical Party formulated the concept of the electoral pact, and imposed its will upon the general membership «...con procedimientos absolutistas...» Radical leaders then approached the Federal Republicans, who in their Assembly ratified the coalición after being moved to do so by Emilio Castelar's rhetoric. The Alphonsists, always searching for a means to undermine Amadeo, quickly approved the pact, as did the Carlists for similar reasons. Galdós cannot hide his incredulity, for Ruiz Zorrilla and the Radicals have successively played the demagogues, the courtesans and the devout (idem, 131). Angered, outraged and disgusted with this aggregate of political contradictions which aspires to bring down the government, Galdós in a fit of vicious sarcasm and irony underscores the absurdity:
—80→[...] los demagogos desahuciados, los alfonsinos sentimentales, los carlistas incultos y fanáticos son los que han de salvar esta sociedad que se desquicia y esta nacion que muere. |
| (idem) | ||
There is no doubt that Galdós accurately foresaw the havoc which the coalición would wreak in Spanish national politics. The elections were a disaster for the members of the coalición, thus discrediting the various party legalists who had favored the coalición over retraimiento.127 Party activists now dominated policy. The most immediate results of this backlash to the failure at the polls was the Carlist retraimiento of 15 April and their subsequent revolt on the twenty-first (idem, 610-611).128 A short time later in May, Sagasta, faced by threats of retraimiento from both Radicals and Republicans and by a ministerial scandal, resigned (XXVI, 296-300). Galdós sagaciously predicts that Serrano will head the new government, and fearfully dares to hope that this will signal political stability (idem, 300).129 Galdós also happily notes that Ruiz Zorrilla announced his retirement from politics, due to the fact that the coalición had split the Radicals, wrested Ruiz Zorrilla's leadership from him, and placed party strength in the hands of the left-wing element favoring retraimiento (idem, 456-457, 461-463). In sum, then, the coalición nacional divided those parties which engendered it and ultimately occasioned the polarization of political forces into opposition extremism and government conservatism.
It was this polarization which brought down Serrano's government in June, 1872. With the Carlists threatening in the north, the Republicans advocating insurrection in the south and cast, the merger of Alphonsists and Montpensierists, and the alliance of Radicals and Republicans in yet another attempt to undermine the monarchy, Serrano had decided (as was his right as Prime Minister) to suspend constitutional guarantees (idem, 608-609). But Amadeo, in spite of Serrano's decided parliamentary majority, opposed this implementation of Article 31 of the Constitution «...y esta divergencia entre la Corona y el ministerio trajo necesariamente la caida de éste y la elevacion inesperada del partido radical. (idem, 610)»
The sudden return of the Radicals to power by non-violent and entirely legal means brought Ruiz Zorrilla out of retirement and into the vanguard of Radical leadership. It was he who dissolved the Cortes on 28 June and called a general election for 24 August. Galdós at this stage is not even cautiously optimistic. The Radicals have come into power believing themselves providentially singled out for the task of restoring order and stability; however, Galdós prophetically muses «...no sabemos si pondrán mano tambien los republicanos y otros improvisados amigos y co-participes de la situacion. (idem, 613)» And in effect, Ruiz Zorrilla, desiring to consolidate his position, invited Republican support for his projected ministry. His campaign consisted of a platform (reviewed by Galdós on 28 August130) of pirated Republican proposals, the most important (and subsequently most damaging to his Radical government) being the abolition of the quintas and matriculas de mar, and the separation of Church and State (XXVII, 558-560).131 And as before, Ruiz Zorrilla was catering to interests within his own party whose power he would later be unable to control; Galdós therefore feels compelled to predict (idem, 561-562) the future disintegration of the Radicals and therefore the monarchy,132 concluding:
| (idem, 562, italics mine)133 | ||
Besides being an historically objective, unusually accurate contemporary chronicle written by a sophisticated student of politics, the Galdós articles in the «Revista política interior» afford a remarkable insight into the socio-political attitudes of their author. He saw Spain devouring itself at a time when it was enjoying an unprecedented potential for political and social development. Forced to bear witness to this situation, he forged his political ideas out of the anguish at seeing his nation torn apart by self-interest on the one hand and what he considered unrealistic ideologies on the other.
The first prerequisite for progressive expansion was governmental stability. For this reason Galdós could not condemn Serrano's intent to exercise the prerogatives of Article 31 of the Constitution. It was merely the logical, politically consistent expression of the government desire to overcome its parliamentary and national difficulties «...con noble decision, dentro de su criterio conservador... (XXVI, 609, italics mine» Further, this was not a violation of the Constitution, but the application of one of its most important and perspicacious provisions. Only future events would determine the wisdom of Serrano's decision: to challenge it immediately as an attempt at dictatorship merely demonstrated that «...no está muy versado en el conocimiento de sus principales leyes el pueblo que cree ver menospreciada su Constitucion cuando se pone en ejercicio uno de sus preceptos. (idem, 609-610»134)
It was also in the interests of stability to maintain a strong, well-equipped and well-trained army, Galdós asserts. The public is so unschooled in self-government that not only can it not insure the success and security of the Revolution, but it is even incapable of providing the peaceful ambience for what we might call the politics of stagnation: the violence shaking Spain and Spanish national affairs can only lead to regression and must therefore be checked (idem, 614). Further, these who term the army a political lever are actually the same individuals who attempt to foster its partisanship; the army must not be allowed to continue as a prey to the spoils system: «El mal consiste en que las distintas situaciones que se suceden al mando, tienden á hacer un ejército á su imágen [sic] y semejanza (idem, 615)».135 Nor should one be complacent about the potential of a civilian militia, repeatedly demanded by the Left, as a cure-all for the difficulties facing the formation of an apolitical armed forces; the militia could not at present carry out the responsibilities of the army.136 Since the militia has been born out of resentment for the army, is in fact one of its chief antagonists, «Una de las dos instituciones está de más, y tan sólo parece lógico la fusion de entrambas, poniendo en práctica el principio... del servicio obligatorio y remunerado... (idem)» This would of course mean the abolition of the hated and discriminatory quintas and matrículas de mar in favor of general compulsory military service (idem). But Galdós sadly reminds the reader of an oppressing fact of national life: the government has neither the power nor the funds necessary for the implementation of such a «...proyecto de tanta trascendencia... (idem)» Hence, whether the —82→ government and the public like it or not, the realities of the situation preclude any attempts at present to modify the structure of the army.
If stability was for Galdós the prerequisite for progress, conciliation was its by-word. He could not abide the abolition of the fueros which were so much a part of Basque tradition. Absolutism was fostered in the small towns and villages; lack of equal representation of the cities in provincial affairs would only continue to lead to their involvement in Carlist movements. Indeed, a modification not of the basic precepts of the fueros but of the laws governing their exercise within the provinces themselves was the only way to erase the Carlist menace (idem, 139). The fueros, «preciosas franquicias», had been enjoyed for hundreds of years. They were institutions conducive to political and social structures frequently admired by foreign countries; «...pero las mudanzas históricas variando las condiciones de los pueblos, exigen que aquellas [instituciones forales] sean adaptadas á las necesidades presentes (idem, 140, italics mine)»
The foregoing measures, for all their palliative effects, are of little import without the presence of a two-party system over which presides a constitutional monarch. One of the parties must be the Conservative.137 The latter was the object of calumny attempting to undermine it by labelling it as reactionary and dangerous to revolutionary institutions. Such unreasonable criticism is particularly insidious insofar as the «...tendencia conservadora..., realizada honradamente en la práctica, ha de dar á ciertos organismos politicos el crédito de que por desgracia carecen... (XXIV, 611)» Galdós means by this that the Conservatives must bridge the gap between national custom and liberal ideas. They have the task of educating the people, of teaching them how to implement liberal institutions without giving rise to political and social upheaval. A large part of society, drawn from all classes, fears change as much as it hated the regime of Isabel II:
| (idem, 611-612, italics mine) | ||
No less urgent is the formation of a powerful opposition, a constitutional minority which «...disputara el poder á la fraccion conservadora con tenacidad, hasta con ensañamiento... (XXV, 456)» While the minority should not be monolithic in its ideological structure, it must certainly not be heterogeneous to the extent proposed by the Radical coalición nacional. For such an opposition will only lead to disorder and political opportunism, and once having supplanted the Conservatives will be utterly incapable of governing (idem). Galdós of course does not speak of a minority in the quantitative sense of the word. He simply means an opposition party which, in conjunction with the Conservatives, «...existen uniformes, poderosos, robustos los dos partidos constitucionales, en cuyo turno sosegado estriba que la política sea una fecunda lucha en vez de un pugilato de pasiones y de destinos. (XXIV, 614, italics mine)» This party of the opposition must be the Radical Party. Within the constitutional framework, the Radicals represent an exuberant burst of ideological initiative, and can therefore best develop the progressive institutions which are to replace those older —83→ ones of a more traditional cast. It is the Radical Party which must translate revolutionary principles into workable canon:
| (idem, 612) | ||
Differentiating Galdós' vision of a two-party system from the turno pacífico later implemented by Cánovas during the Restoration is the strict maintenance of ideological integrity and its corresponding socio-political purpose by each party; without the «juego y equilibrado contrapeso» which such political independence affords, no constitutional regime is possible (XXV, 621). It is this which Amadeo of Savoy attempted but failed to achieve.138
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